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A Review of Canadian Radiocommunications Law Around
‘‘Jammers’’
Tyson Macaulay† ‡

Introduction

munications through ISM for ‘‘emergency communications’’ as articulated in the cell phone silencer debate.

T

his comment argues that the Radiocommunications
Act should be amended to relax the prohibition on
specific types of ‘‘smart’’ jamming in the Industry Science
Medicine (ISM) bands. Specifically, the legislation
requires increased flexibility and granularity to accommodate new wireless technologies in the ISM bands —
particularly wireless LAN (WLAN) technologies like
IEEEE 802.11b/IEEE 802.11g (WiFi), and IEEE 802.11a
(henceforth collectively know as ‘‘ISM radios’’).

Background to the
Radiocommunications Jamming
Debate in Canada

T

he jamming prohibition as it exists in Canada is
represented by the Radiocommunications Act, 1 paragraph 9(1)(b):

The availability of cheap, mass-produced ISM radios
hardware and the proliferation of applications using the
ISM spectrum bands of 2.4Ghz and 5Ghz present a
variety of security and privacy concerns that cannot be
effectively addressed by existing legislation, regulation,
and law enforcement agencies. ‘‘Jamming’’ in certain
forms represents a necessary, defensive capability for
both users and non-users of the ISM-band applications.

9. (1) No person shall
(b) without lawful excuse, interfere with or obstruct
any Radiocommunication;

‘‘Lawful excuse’’ is clarified in Exemption Order No.
2002-1: 2
2. (1) Subject to sections 3 and 4, Her Majesty in right
of Canada, as represented by the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police and the Canadian Forces, is exempt from the application of subsection 4(1) and paragraph 9(1)(b) of the Act for
the period beginning on June 17, 2002 and ending on
June 29, 2002.
(2) An exemption under subsection (1) is limited to that
part of Alberta within the quadrilateral defined by points
having the following geographic coordinates: 50˚ 45 N; 113˚
34 W; 50˚ 45 N; 115˚ 30 W; 51˚ 6 N; 113˚ 34 W; 51˚ 6 N; 115˚
30 W.
Conditions
3. An exemption under section 2 in respect of subsection 4(1) of the Act applies only if the radio apparatus
referred to in that subsection is installed, operated or possessed in order to carry out interference with or obstruction
of a radiocommunication in accordance with subsection 4(2) for the purpose of security or safety, international
relations or national defence.
4. (1) An exemption under section 2 in respect of paragraph 9(1)(b) of the Act applies only if the radiocommunication is interfered with or obstructed for the purpose of
security or safety, international relations or national defence.
(2) Every reasonable effort shall be made to confine or
restrict to the extent possible interference with or obstruction of a radiocommunication referred to in subsection (1)
to the smallest physical area, the fewest number of frequencies and the minimum duration required to accomplish the
objectives of the interference or obstruction.

To start at the end:
●

●

It is proposed that jamming in the ISM bands —
particularly for WLAN devices — should be redefined as a legal but licensable measure for
organizations and individuals.
It is proposed that the caveats put forth in this
paper around ISM jamming be simultaneously
employed to retain a prohibition against malicious or negligent use of jamming devices. Different ‘‘smart’’ jamming techniques and capabilities should be defined as permissible for usage,
while certain forms of aggressive ‘‘dumb’’ broadcast jamming techniques can remain prohibited.

The proliferation of ISM networking devices, and
specifically WLAN devices, has made this capability a
requirement for corporate security and privacy protection. Additionally, the rationale used to maintain the
prohibition around ‘‘cell phone silencers’’ does not apply
to ISM networking: the spectrum is shared, not licensed,
and there is no reasonable expectation of access to com†  CCH Canadian Limited.
‡ CISSP CISA
83

84

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

The above is a broad and sweeping prohibition of
import into Canada for entities other than those
jamming and has been partially reviewed through the
exempted specifically in the Radiocommunications Act.
recent public consultation around ‘‘cell phone
The primary reason given for this position is that
silencers’’. 3 From March 2001 to June 2002, a public
cellular radio communications in particular are now
consultation was held by Industry Canada around the
considered as critical communications tools. The examutility of cellular phone ‘‘silencing’’ equipment. In the
ples of on-call doctors and emergency response staff like
consultation paper, ‘‘silencing’’ was considered to employ
firefighters were cited in the decision as justification for
up to 5 possible techniques: 4
the ban. This position represents a rational fear of uncon1. Jamming Devices — By way of radio fretrolled ‘‘jamming’’ and the chaos it could inflict upon
quency interference, the device prevents pagers
society and essential services; however, it fails to consider
and mobile phones from transmitting or
`
the unanticipated impact of blanket regulations vis-a-vis
receiving calls by transmitting a jamming signal.
unregulated portions of the radio spectrum, the ISM
bands.
2. Intelligent Disablers — By way of a signal
detection function, the device communicates
The telecommunications carrier industry was, at the
with the base station of the mobile phone users’
time, united in its opposition to radio silencers, basing its
wireless service provider indicating that particopposition on the ‘‘emergency communications’’ arguular mobile phone is in a quiet zone and consement. This was a rational position at the time given that
quently communication is not established.
any potential, uncontrolled degradation in service (from
private jammers) had a potentially massive impact on the
3. Intelligent Beacon Disablers — By way of
perceived value of the wireless communications services
beacon-like operation, the device instructs any
on offer.
compatible mobile phone to disable its ringer,
turn down its volume or to switch the phone to a
The general public tended to be split on the issue.
vibrate-signalling mode.
Those members of the public who supported jammers
4. Direct Receive and Transmit Jammers —
cited nuisance and annoyance factors. The supporters
By way of base station-like features, the device
advocated regulation via by-laws, in the same way many
interacts with the operation of local mobile
nuisance issues such as noise and unleashed dogs are
6
phones in its proximity to break or unhook the
regulated.
communications link, before returning to a pasAn important point to note in the cellphone
sive mode.
silencer decision is that, while deceptive/‘‘smart’’
5. Passive Jamming Devices — By way of eleccellphone jammers are prohibited, they also do not exist.
tromagnetic interference (EMI) suppression techDeceptive jammers, as described in the Industry Canada
niques, a defined space/room is constructed in a
consultation paper, are not manufactured and could not
way that prevents the transmission or reception
be supported under the currently available cellular infraof radio signals within the shielded space/room
structure. Significant improvements and investments
(commonly know as a Faraday Cage).
would have to occur in both mobile phone and basestation technology. Such investments are not forthThe definitions above use either ‘‘disabler’’ or
coming in the near future, and there are no current
‘‘jammer’’ when referring to the different silencing techbusiness cases to support such investment. Therefore, the
niques. The distinction in these terms represents the disprohibition itself is pre-emptive in the case of cellular
tinction between two broader categories of signal jamservices.
ming: denial of service (DOS) jamming and deceptive
jamming.
The cellphone silencer consultation process was
DOS jamming essentially has an impact on all wireextensive. It is not the intent of this paper to re-open the
less devices on a given frequency in a given area, much
issue of cellphone silencers. However, the wording of
like a DOS attack on an Internet address will have an
both the consultation paper and the resulting Order in
impact on all users and applications operating from a
Council amending the Radiocommunications Act cast a
given Internet address, or possibly the entire network
wide net in terms of prohibiting all ‘‘wireless’’
segment.
silencing/jamming devices, rather than only cellphone
devices. It was likely the intent of Industry Canada to do
Deceptive jamming is also referred to as ‘‘smart’’
precisely this: ban all wireless jammers.
amming, whereby specific devices can be disabled,
eaving other devices using the same radio spectrum to
In the case of ISM (specifically WLAN) technologies,
perate normally. This would be analogous to disabling
the deceptive technology does exist, and there is a busie computer on the local LAN while leaving all the
ness case and requirement for jamming: security and
her computers (and users) unaffected and functioning.
privacy protection. The Order in Council has inadverThe final decision from Industry Canada in Gazette
tently hobbled businesses, consumers, and government
ice DGTP 005-02 specifically disallowed all radio
from implementing an increasingly important set of
5 They are illegal for sale, manufacture, use, or
cers.
information asset safeguards.
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Even before the Order in Council was finalized,
technology had already substantially changed both the
requirements and business case around certain types of
jammers, WLAN jammers specifically. Sales of WLAN
equipment operating in the ISM 2.4Ghz and 5Ghz
bands have skyrocketed. Similarly, the cost of this equipment has fallen very significantly, to the point where it is
available to just about any organization or individual. It
is now possible to buy ‘‘starter’’ kits consisting of an
Access Point and accompanying interface card for less
than $100. Additional WLAN radios for standard laptop
computers cost less than $50 and can be purchased at
any office supply store. The combination of the
affordability of WLAN equipment with the savings, 7
convenience, and mobility of wireless communications
presents a major potential security and privacy problem
that under current regulations is unaddressable, and a
legitimate business opportunity around remediation that
is prohibited.
The security and privacy problems relating to
WLAN radios have been documented and reported
extensively in both academic and professional forums,
and in the media at large. 8 For the following reasons,
WLAN radios can create major security and privacy
(therefore possibly regulatory) problems for organizations and individuals:
●

●

Unauthorized backdoors: WLAN radios are very
easy to acquire and connect to fixed-line networks without any technical skills. WLAN
radios are cheap and very attractive because they
are an obviously useful improvement over fixedline networking, so well-meaning but naive
users establish them inside corporate networks
without permission. These WLAN radios create
a direct, back-door into the network they are
attached to, like a second Internet connection,
but without the knowledge of the network
administrators or the benefit of a firewall.
Awareness and containment: Unlike fixed-line
networks, which require some sort of professionally installed point of demarcation, unauthorized WLAN connections to the network can
appear inside organizations literally over lunch,
and disappear as quickly. Network or security
staff will have a great deal of difficulty spotting
these back doors — consequently, in most cases,
they are unaware of the extreme vulnerability
that has appeared. Even with sophisticated and
diligent monitoring of network traffic, the difference between knowing the unauthorized device
has appeared and disabling the device is the difference between hearing a barking dog in the
night and then locating and muzzling the dog.

Due to these two issues, WLAN radios can present
substantial threats to the security and privacy of data. An
easing of the ban on ‘‘smart’’ jammers may allow these
issues to be addressed.

A Framework for Smart WLAN
Jamming

D

ata security generally consists of three elements:
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Confidentiality relates to the threat of unauthorized disclosure
or publication of information, and broadly, loss of privacy. Integrity refers to threats related to corruption,
unauthorized alternation, substitution, or removal of
data. Availability relates to threats that can make data
unavailable or delayed when it is needed. While confidentiality and integrity issues are dealt with extensively
by a variety of cryptographic tools and techniques available for modern WLAN radios, it is the element of availability and WLAN radios that presents major security
concerns and is impacted by the prohibition on jamming.
For the purposes of this discussion, organizations
can be grouped into two classifications: those sanctioning WLAN radios for internal usage and those
prohibiting WLAN radios. In the first case, these organizations may use WLAN radios and networks for mission-critical systems and information, and rely on
WLAN radios to connect people to core resources. In the
second case, organizations may have established a prohibition for any number of security reasons. For instance,
risks associated with deliberate or accidental exposures
through (difficult to control) wireless interfaces may be
too substantial, so information is restricted to fixed-line
networks only. In both cases, the availability of WLAN
radios is of prime concern. Smart jamming is one of the
few means by which these organizations can warrant the
security of their data resources.
In the first instance, organizations utilizing WLAN
radios benefit from an option to implement security
tools to protect and manage the availability of WLAN
resources. However, the nature of WLAN radios and
networks is such that they are subject to frequent and
often substantial fluctuations in services levels. Additionally, traditional network management techniques can
address ‘‘abusive’’ devices that threaten availability. Smart
jammers are not justified by the needs of these WLAN‘‘friendly’’ organizations.
In the second instance, organizations imposing a
prohibition on WLAN radios need to have the ability to
enforce this prohibition through localized smart jamming of WLAN radio devices. Such a capability is analogous to being able to disallow Internet access to certain
parts of the corporate network, or the network as a
whole, practices common in organizations with valuable
data, such as financial institutions. Under the current
policy position of Industry Canada, organizations
attempting to enforce prohibitions on WLAN devices
for a variety of overwhelming security and privacy
imperatives are hamstrung.
In Canada, the United States, and much of the
world where sophisticated spectrum regulation is in
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place, anti-jamming policy was developed based upon a
snapshot in time of wireless technology. In revisiting the
regulations around smart jammers, the following criteria
may prove useful:
●
Smart jammers are only permissible in ISM
bands. 9
●
Smart jamming devices must comply with all
ISM device regulations. 10
●
Smart jammers cannot be automated, and jamming must be manually invoked by an operator.
●
Smart jammers cannot be deployed in such a
manner that they impact the legitimate use of
ISM devices by any third party.
●
Public notices that smart jammers are deployed
must be posted, such that potentially impacted
third parties are aware of their existence.
●
The deployment of smart jamming technology
is subject to regulatory notification/licence and
associated registration fees. 11
●
Sanctions are associated with inappropriate, negligent, or malicious employment of smart jammers.
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networks to make the comparison sustainable. The
fixed-line Internet allows attacks to be launched from
the other side of the world. Attacks originating through
WLAN networks must be highly localized because of
the power limitations of these devices. It is significantly
less likely that smart jamming (if regulated as described
above) will disable an unintended device or start a catastrophic, cascading series of counter-measures.
The reservation of the ISM spectrum bands for use
by low-power, unregulated radios has proven to be a
highly productive industrial catalyst. A wide variety of
wireless technologies and applications are flourishing in
the ISM bands, and will continue to do so. The fundamental condition of ISM that has made it so successful is
the limited amount of regulation. The regulation that
does exist for ISM has been tempered specifically to
allow for innovation.
The ‘‘cellphone silencer’’ consultation led to jamming of all sorts being conclusively prohibited (except
for law enforcement and the military). However,
cellphone jamming is fundamentally different from the
propositions posed here, for two reasons:
1. The cellular and PCS spectrum is reserved, regulated, and paid for through license fees paid by
carriers, and in turn, subscribers. Both carriers
and subscribers expect unimpeded access to this
spectrum for the tariffs they pay. It is also a
matter of accessing critical infrastructure for
emergency purposes, which was the fundamental
basis of the Industry Canada decision. But no one
has paid for ISM spectrum access. No one has a
reasonable claim to unlimited access. No one can
argue that ISM must be available for emergency
communications; therefore, engaging all available
protections for this spectrum is out of proportion
to the reality of the benefits and risks associated
with this substantially different use of spectrum.

Conclusion

S

tarting in the summer of 2002, the introduction of
active, network-based attack counter-measure tools
started a debate around what came to be known as
‘‘strike-back’’, 12 a phenomenon whereby protagonists
launched counter-attacks against Internet sites that
appeared to be the source of network attacks over the
Internet. One side of this debate argued that such
counter-attacks will inevitably go astray and are counter
to our natural response system, which assumes innocence and deplores vigilantism. The other side in this
argument claims that self-defense is an immutable right
and that these responses are not punitive, but rather,
remedial. 13
The ideas presented in this paper do not represent a
wireless version of ‘‘strike-back’’. The Internet and fixedline networks are too substantially different from WLAN

2. Unlike cellular and PCS equipment, the cost to
obtain an ISM (WLAN) radio transmitter and
establish a network for it is trivial. Put another
way, no one is likely to connect a ‘‘rogue’’ GSM
or CDMA basestation to a LAN.

Notes:
1

Radiocommunications Act, R.S.C. 1985, http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/
internet/insmt-gst.nsf/en/sf01140e.html.
2 http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/insmt-gst.nsf/en/sf05959e.html;
SOR/2002-223.
3 http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/insmt-gst.nsf/en/sf05408e.html.
4 http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/insmt-gst.nsf/en/sf05401e.html.
5 http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/insmt-gst.nsf/en/sf05958e.html.
6 See the comments received by Industry Canada to the consultation paper:
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/insmt-gst.nsf/en/sf05415e.html.
7 802.11 Planet — http://www.80211-planet.com/tutorials/
article.php/953691.

8

WiFi Planet (formerly 802.11 Planet) http://wi-fiplanet.com/ is a rich
source of technical news and discussions around ISM and WLAN security.
A search on the term ‘‘802.11 security’’ returns over 1500 articles.

9

Until such time as they become viable for metropolitan area networks
such as cellular services.

10 For

instance, no enhanced broadcasting power.

11 Similar

to the way point-to-point wireless links in 23/28Ghrz must be
licensed for a nominal fee.

12

Crypto-gram, December 2002 — http://www.counterpane.com/cryptogram-0212.html.

13 Strikeback

Whitepaper — http://www.hammerofgod.com.

